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A PRELIMINARY SOCIOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE)
Chaitanya Mishra
Introduction
The notion of development, despite its universal currency
and exhortatory potential, in some ways reminds one of the story
of the elephant and the six blind men. "Development" is
somehow holy, uplifting and attractive. It is, however, also
mysterious. The object is subjectively perceived and the totality
of subjectivities does not add ul? to an objective description
and/or assessment. Instead the totality becomes more and more
grotesque, unfamiliar and abstract. A goal which is itself
mysterious, in turn, inspires a mode of practice which is
essentially misleading.
On the other hand, a valid conceptualization of the
"developmental problem," would enable us to a) shed the
mystery embedded in the notions of development and
underdevelopment; b) assess current developmental practice more
objectively; and c) sift alternative potential bases for
development. Put another way, a valid conceptualization of the
"developmental problem" would help us enumerate and analyze
constraints against and options for what might be an adequate
design for future development.
It is one of the more general central arguments of this
paper that a valid conceptualization of the "development problem"
can be approximated by analyzing a set of three structural
processes: those related to the capitalistic world-system -- the
capitalistic world-economy in particular, the internal class
relationships within a given sub-world economy, and the form of
utilization of political-economic resource. It should be
emphasized that these parameters are distinct only analytically;
these are parts of a historical process, united within a historical
whole. These parameters can be made more specific and theIr
mutual relationships unraveled only as part of an effort geared at
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a reconstruction of history. Time, in this sense, is the fourth
"process" we need to explicitly consider.
What do we mean when we say that we are
underdeveloped? Is the underdevelopment we talk about a
characteristic feature of families, communities, regions, classes,
the state organization or of the nation-state as a whole? What is
the genesis and later history of this underdevelopment? Has
underdevelopment been a perennial and constant feature of our
national history? Are we experiencing a further development of
underdevelopment or are we in a steady state, a "low-equilibrium
trap"? What roles have the international economic ensembles
played in our developmental history? What has been the role of
the various classes of our society in our developmental history?
What kind of development have we been talking about in any
case? Where do the developmental politics and programmes the
state has been laying out in the past fit in this context? Finally,
where do we go from here?
Clearly, this is a very tall order and it sounds arrogant to
seek sketchy and preliminary answers to these questions. But I
audaciously ask these questions because they are fundamental
ones which cannot be left unanswered. The majority of us spend
most of our time bogged down in details of programme and
project administration, text book teaching, small-scale empirical,
"disciplinary," or sectoral research and the like, with little time
out to consider larger issues. Journalists and ideologues as
groups are exceptions -- they have done a much better job of it.
I would like to begin by providing a brief answer to the
first question raised above. Underdevelopment in Nepal (as in
many other third would economies) should be seen as a process
which may be characterized by a) increasing incorporation within
the capitalist world-and regional-system in terms of labour,
commodities and capitaUfinance; b) increasing loss of capacity to
reproduce indigenous means of subsistence-production,
combined with a diminishing or very low capacity to carry out
expanded reproduction; c) emergence and growth of the
comprador bourgeoisie (wh.ose interests are closely tied with
world and regional capitalism) and the state class which contains
nationalist components but which cannot lead a national
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transformation because of its strong political alliance with the
feudal and other traditional -- i.e., precapitalist -- structures and
its fast-growing economic and financial ties with the comprador
bourgeoisie; d) considerable to serious problems of familial,
community-based, regional and national integration arising out of
peripheralization and marginalization on the one hand and on the
other, the successful resistance kept up by the state, the feudal
elements and the comprador bourgeoisie to mass-based political-
developmental forms. As noted earlier, we must go back to
history to sketch L1e manifestations of these processes.
The Processes of Capitalism
Before we go back to our history it may be necessary to
provide a brief note on the essence of the capitalist world-
process. Founded on the ruins of European feudalism, capitalism
is a relatively recent human experience; it is less than 350 years
old. It has undergone changes during its lifespan; the phases it
has gone through in historical sequence are roughly labeled
"mercantile," "competitive," and "monopolistic." These phases
are marked by important variations, but the commonality is of far
greater significance for the present discussion. Capitalism is a
political-economic system which thrives on the creation of
commodities and on incessant expanded accumulation. The
essence of the capitalist process is disarmingly simple: the
creation of commodities leads to the generation of profit, a part of
which is reinvested to produce further commodities and so on.
The cycle is repeated and expanded over and over again until a
given market is near-saturated.
This was how capitalism began its tenure in certain
European towns and cities. The capitalistic production system,
however, was so efficient that it overran or dominated all other
production systems -- and together with it, local and national
institutions -- almost over all of Europe in the next half-century.
The successes of the system, in course of a relatively short span
of time, produced its own problem -- the saturation of the market.
The resulting demand and supply bottlenecks were then
overcome with trans-continental leaps. The era that we know as
colonial thus began to take shape. (To be sure, long dIstance
trade and "rich man's trade" in which traders traversed great
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distances to procure unusual and therefore high priced items -- as
well as more mundane commodities, i.e. salt -- has a history
much older than capitalism. But these are instances of primitive
accumulation and conspicuous consumption. These exchanges --
primarily barter exchanges -- did not lead to expanded
accumulation.) The capitalist economic system thus encroached
upon and incorporated lesser cities, towns and villages and
families, communities, ethnic groups, tribes and natives in the
colonies. Inevitably, many groups werc pushed out: various pn;-
capitalist production systems and social and political institutions
based upon such systems of production, less efficient producers
(in terms of the rate and expansion of the creation of exchange
and surplus values), communities, institutions, class and status
groups, and entire states. Social institutions like family,
marriage, education, work/employment, along with socio-
biological processes (e.g., birth and death) were transformed or
modified and adapted to the exigencies of the capitalist frame.
However, the capitalist system not only pushed out, transformcd,
or modified traditional, i.e., precapitalist, institutions, but also
created the threc major institutions of our everyday life at the
present: 1) the core capitalist (devcloped), semiperipheral and
peripheral (underdeveloped) world areas, 2) the class-bascd
nature of the society, and 3) the global interstate system.
The characteristic features of underdevelopment outlined
earlier are endemic, to a greater or lesser degree, to all world
peripheral formations and constitute a unique and inevitable
creation of the capitalist world-economy. Thus, the pcripheral
formations are entirely normal outgrowths of the inner law of
capitalist developmcnt -- that of expanded accumulation -- at the
world scale. The creation of what came to be known as the third
world is really what Lenin meant when he spoke of the widening
of the capitalist economy. The continual development of
capitalism is contingent on the creation of such peripheries -- it
could not prosper without it. This is simply because of the fact
that bereft of the continuous creation of peripheries -- which can
provide cheaper natural resources and labour power as well as
capital/finance and form outl,ets for the commodities produced --
the rate of accumulation of profit, the engine of the capitalist
mode of production, would tend to fall. In the case the capitalist
political economic formation would lose its vitality and crumble
rather quickly. If, by now, the fourth- and fifth-worlds have
come into existence, these are evidcnces of the continuing
viability of the core as well as semiperipheral and peripheral
capitalist formations to widen and deepen (Lenin, once again) the
peripheralization of the "primitive," i.e., precapitalist, economies
in and around them.
The capitalist encroachment is essentially "economic" --
accumulation is of paramount importance. But to the extent that
political and military controls are neccssary to ensure unhindered
accumulation, such are sought to be established, as in the cases
of the multitude of Asian, African and South American colonies.
Such controls are established not only in the colonies proper but
also in the immediately outlying regions which would, in any
case, be under current economic penetration -- for greater
accumulative security. The outlying regions, in general, are
formed out of relatively weak, small and pliable neighbors who
may, depending upon the geostrategic context, be out in the
position of a buffer against other capitalist or otherwise powerful
precapitalist formations, e.g., feudal empires. While colonialism
proper is dead -- not in small measure due to the rise of
nationalism in the colonies but also because the political and
economic costs associated with the colonies were too high and
also because there were softer option's -- monopoly capitalism
keeps the essence of the capitalist process alive through a variety
of means. Thus the whole series of the present-day Asian (and
many other) marginal peripheral formation were shaped and
reshaped in many ways: hegemony -- nuclear and convcntional
military-political terrors, military organizations and treaties,
invasions, military assistance, anti-"terrorist" offensives,
delineation of encompassing security frontiers and spheres of
influence, security council resolutions and vetoes etc.;
neocolonialism -- trade, monopolies, market extension, aid, loan,
capital/financial and debt arrangements, etc.; and finally, the
creation of comprador alliances. Thus the shaping and reshaping
of the interstate system and the development of
underdevelopment in peripheral formations in general and the
periphery at the margins in particular, e.g., Laos, Cambodia,
Bhutan, Sikkim (?), Sri Lanka, Tibet (?), Nepal, Afghanistan (?).
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Indeed, the shaping and reshaping of such states has been a
global routine in the last 350 years. It is no coincidence either that
capitalism is just about that age.
The Onset of Underdevelopment
It is difficult to locate the onset of underdevelopment in
Nepal precisely. A number of "guideposts," however, lead me to
locate its beginning during the middle of the 1880s. As most
other historical markers, this is only an approximation. If the
marker makes sense, we have lived through exactly one century
-- five generations -- of this long, drawn-out crisis. To many,
and because of the long time-frame envisaged, this will look like
a prelude to a too dilute version of the stage of underdevelopment
in which we currently find ourselves. To some, it may also look
like an effort geared, if innocently, to defuse the seriousness of
the present situation. Apart from underscoring our general
tendency to expcrience time in a manner in which the present
always looms larger than the past (attributable to a mystification
of history which then hides or altogether severs the "living" from
the "dead"), I will try to bridge the gap between the "two views"
by means of the following arguments: There is little doubt that
under-development has developed further in recent years. I
would put the cutoff date for "recent years" at 1949-1950. Within
the last 35 years, further movements definitely indicate an
intensification of underdevelopment. Hence the urgency: a sense
of the immediacy of underdevelopment; a "need" to telescope the
"developmental problem." I think it is, nonetheless, historically
more valid to look at current underdevelopment as part of a larger
history of peripheralization. One should be able to see an
intensification of an overall trend without denying a past for it.
Underdevelopment in Nepal, therefore, has a long history whose
roots lie in the continuous, if uneven, process of
peripheralization. If it was the world capitalist power, the British
Empire, under whose auspices peripheralization and
underdevelopment marched ahead before 1947, the Indian
dominant alliance has been the immediate motive force in this
process in the more recent past as well as at present. The Nepali
state alliance, composed of the state class, i.e., the proponents of
the various formal political-organizational systems we have
created and lived under. the town-hased "middle class," the
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feudal landed interests and the comprador bourgeoisie which, as
we shall see, are largely offshoots of this process of
peripheralization, is the main link through which this process is
sustained and underdevelopment reproduced.
The Past and the Present· ca 1700-1884
Let us consider our history ca. 1700-1884: the period of
the creation of "Modern Nepal" and the period immediately
preceding it, which from now on we shall refer to as "prc-
peripheralized Nepal." As in all precapitalist economies the world
over there were immense variations in political-economic forms
here: The precapitalist world is a world of seclusion, variation,
and the stuff of romantic uniqueness: precapitaJist economies are
not based on expansion and ever-encompassing levels of
integration. At the very least, four economic zones could he
discerned; the Himalayan region, the eastern and central hills: the
western hills and the Tara!. The four zones differed suhstanlJally
not only with respect to primary production hut also with respeci
to the resource base, the nature of landholding nghts.
oroanization of labour, fiscal system, degree of monetization,
expansivencss of the market, class differentiation, relations of
production, and so on. Towns located along the relallvely
densely populated Mahabharat range, and the more sparsely
populated nonhern and southern horders, added to the vanat Ion.
At this point, however, it is neccssary to establish a
"modal" picture, even at the expense of some prec!slon. The
precapitalist economies withll1 the early pre-penpherallzed Nepal
may be said to be variations on tribute-payll1g-cum-feudal modes
of production. Two further points, nonetheless, have to be kept
in mind while reading the pre-peripheral history. FIrst, we do not
have a clean survey of the political-economy of the Nepali state
for the period. Therefore, we shall have to reconstr~ct one from
patchy and selective information available. Second, It should also
be remembered that the political-economic system dunng the pl'<;-
peripheral period was itself dynamic due, malOly, to .tour
influences; the changing fortunes of the Nepal-Tibet trade. the
decline of the Moghul er;Jpire and the nse of the lesser
feudatories; the upheavals and reorgal11zallons Immediately
II
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preceding and following the forging of the Nepali state; and,
most importantly, the rise of the East India Company.
The predominant productive activity was agriculture,
including a fair spread of slash-and-bum agriculture both in the
hills and the Tarai. The Himalayan region, the 24 Nepal-Tibet
trade route areas in particular, the Kathmandu Valley and a few
other small areas had been thriving on entrepot, or long-distance
trade, for over one millenium -- an almost universal economic
mode in a region lying between two different
geographicallcivilizational areas. The Kathmandu Valley had been
enjoying a highly developed agrarian-artisan-trading culture al
least from the seventh century onwards. There were few other
urban areas, however, and non-sexlnon-age division of labour
was rudimentary. Thejajmllni system, so entrenched in the plains
of India, had a rather weak base in the hills. During the beginning
of the 19th century, approximately four-fifths of the total state
revenue was comprised of land revenues. Of the total state
revenue of Rs. (I.e.) 1.7 million in 1853, 68 percent had accrued
from land revenues. Fines, customs duties and sale of sakhuwa
(sal) timber contributed only small amounts to the state funds.
Much was spent on the upkeep of the military. Non-state
resources -- i.e., community, family -- played a predominant part
not only in public construction projects but also in the military
effort: by way of procuring provisions, and construction of trails,
culverts and bridges. In part because war preparations diverted a
large amount of resources, the state as well as the rulers were
almost always short of men and materials, and occasionally
borrowed cash from private citizens, often traders. The early stale
allowance practiced swadeshi not merely because of Prithvi
Narayan Shah's injunctions against luxuries and imports, but
also because a) the community and household political-economic
structure was not geared to the creation of large surpluses for the
use of the state alliance, b) the mercantilism of the East India
Company had acquired neither the economic nor the political edge
to enforce itself on the Nepali state, and c) artisans and traders
formed an important component of the Nepali state alliance.
The unification and the incipient penetration of mercantile
capitalism produced a number of very important consequences
for the Nepali society and state. It took a long time (more than
II,
one-hundred years) to unfold. Furthermore, the changes were
much more extensive during the last half-century than dUl;ng the
preceding years. The first consequence of unification was to
speed up the process the disintegration of the communal political-
economic formations, particularly in the central and eastern hills
and the enhancement of a tributary mode. Under the pre-existing
communal mode, land could not be bought, sold, mortgaged,
kept idle or sub-tenanted; it was a community property to be used
by house-holds of that community. The much-repeatcd "self
sufficiency of the hills" was essentially anchorcd in this
supremacy of the community over local h0useholds, and over
other communities and the state. This strength manifested itself in
the strength of village-Icvel self-help groups, a highly integrated
-- although rudimentary exccpt in the Tarai -- division of labor,
conservation, i.e., optimum use combined wilh reproduction and
development of resources, and community leadership. The
usurpation by the state of the right to productive assets --
primarily land but also forests and, in some cases, irrigalion
water -- combined with the separation of the households (and
individuals) from the community, apart from weakening the
community strengths mentioned above, also led to the creation of
rich and poor households. In the relatively cushionless setting of
the hill/mountain, the usurpation effectively signaled and
strengthening of the forces of marginalization and immisel;zation
there. This was also the beginning of "overpopulation" and
ecological deterioration as also of emigration. To put it
differently, the central and eastern hills were following the
western hills and some of the Himalayan regions where land was
privatized and had entered the domain of the market at the latest
by the middle of the 18th century. Privatization of land received a
major push during the 1854-J 868 period when revenue
settlements were revised throughout the kingdom and fresh
records of individual rights in land were compiled.
If the process of the disintegration of the communal mode
and the corresponding strengthening of the tributary mode was
hastened in the central and the eastern hills after unification. a
very different mode was being born in the Tarai. This was the
feUdal mode, and constituted the second consequence of
unification. The feudal mode gained ascendancy side by side wilh
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the annexation of the Tarai areas. Extensive tracts of forest and
agriculture land came under the personal ownership of members
of ruling house, high state -- including military -- officials,
ecclesiastes, local functionaries as well as local "big men." Most
of the feudally-organized holdings were also held under the rent-
free birta tenure. Exploited largely with the labour of migrants
from the adjoining Indian plains who had been pauperized in their
native regions through the Company's policies on cropping,
marketing and industrial establishments and land tenure --
including the infamous Permanent Settlement on795 -- the Tarai
resources increased the national production many fold. No less
significant, however, was the fact that the agrarian structure there
was fcudaHy organized.
The feudal organization of the ownership of resources
had three highly significant consequences. First, it increased the
power of the state by a) enriching the rulers and putting much
greater resources at the disposal of the state, b) firmly
incorporating the local feudal lords within the state alliance
heretofore made up of the ruling houses and the bureaucratic-
military complex, c) enabling it to extend its political
administrative arms across the territory.
Second, it worked effectively against the political-
economic integration of the hill/mountain region on the one hand
and the Tarai on the other. It was this bifurcation in the social
organization of production (that is, the operation of the
communal-tributary mode in the mountain/hill versus the feudal
mode in the Tarai) more than any other factor which produced a
largely regionally divided nation. The self-sufficiency of the hills,
the defense-related rules which hindered easy travell
transportation (including passport requirement and restricti ve
regulations on the use of trails) and the malarial climate of the
Tarai -- the three most frequently mentioned reasons for the lack
of hill/mountain and Tarai integration -- merely fulfilled the
subsidiary conditions. The feudal organization of the ownership
of the resources in the Tarai also led to the development of an
outward bound ("extroverted") economy which became
integrated not at the national level, but beyond it -- the produce of
the Tarai land and the hill labour power showed a tendency to be
integrated within the British Indian and not the Nepali political-
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economic space. The hill labour power and the Tarai land -- in
their separaIe yet similar ways -- helpcd to generate surplus value
for the NepalI state allIance and for the British Indian/empire. The
Implications of this bifurcation will be drawn out in the next
section.
The third consequence of unification was the further
strengthening of the state by the exercising of monopoly rights in
forest ~roducts.' wild animals, minerals, specific cash crops, and
In captive trading of essential commodities in specific internal
markets. The. state discouraged Nepali traders from selling up
shops In India and Instead established export centres inside
Nepali territory and collected export duties. While income
through such monopolics and statc trading was used almost
. wholly. to sustail~ the military buildup in earlier periods
(approxlmatel~,belor~ 1838), the enlargemcnt of the state trading
system, combined wllh on the one hand the extensive revenue
farming, and on the other the absence of wars, meant that a largc
proportion of the income thus generated began to be ve7-y
personalIzed by the members of the state alliance. A very rough
eSUmate indicates that each Rana prime minister appropriated
roughly 25-30 percent of the annual state revenue. Jang
Bahadur's annual salary for 1863 was approximately Rs. (I.C.)
100 thousand. A soldier's annual salary the same year ranged
between Rs. 22 to Rs. 100.
The fourth conscqucnce relatcd more closely to the
development of the mercantile form in India. This was manifested
by India in the import of hill labour and Tarai products and also
by Nepal in the import of the Indian northern-plains labour power
in the feudally organized Tarai and the commodities. including
luxunes, for the use of the members of the state alliance. The
persistence of the Company in trying to open up the Nepali
market, beginning with the 1766 Kinloch expedition. was so
dogged and resolute that it is rather surprising that the Nepali
state could blockade itself for as long as it did. The first interstate
trade statistic, for an unknown year in the first decade of the 19th
century, gives a total figure of Rs. (I.e.) 435 thousand. The
figure had reached Rs. (I.C.) 9.8 million by 1879. The value of
exports during this period was four to five times as much as tht:
'~ value of imports. While this information should elate those who
'.
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compute our trade balance statistics -- a~d those who pl~n for the
deficit -- it really ought not to; the InJlIal penod of contact
between primitive economies and capitalist economics has been to
the former's advantage the world over. The difference between
accumulation, expanded accumulation, and systematic unequal
exchange inexorably tip the balance in favour of the. capItalIst
mode. The imporlance of the trade fIgures lIes malllly 111 the fact
that they indicate an increasing, yet roughly plateaued,
penetration of capitalism in the Nepali political economy.
Limited commodity transaction went hand in hand with
the incipient impon of the choicest Nepali labour pow~r. Thatt.he
initial Nepali labour power was utIlized not dIrectly lor
production but for "secU1~ty," i.e., ~olitical-military pene~ration in
the case of the aggressive and nSlllg Company/EmpIre, only
twists but does not change the overall power of capital to draw in
labour. Mercantile capitalism was beginning to extend itself 10
include Nepal within its organization of production. But the scale
of impolt of labour power was, nevertheless, small. The NepaiJ
state alliance right up to the middle-1880s did not allow open
recruitment of Nepalis in the British Indian army.. A vanety of
punishments, including the death penalty.' were .glven to those
who were found to have JOined the Bnllsh Indian army. The
recruits' families back home were systematically harassed.
Nonetheless, the Company did have some success in recruitment.
And just as importantly, the immiserization of the hills had only
made its first appearances.
The Pasl and the Present: 1885-1949
We now arrive at the 1885-1949 juncture. The processes
set in motion 200 years to 60 years back finally matured by 1885.
Competitive capitalism was at its peak and metropolItan Bntaln
was the world hegemone. Political-economic processes at the
home front almost fully corresponded with the world order.
Nepal henceforlh would serve as a bona fide mem bel' of the
periphery. The shorlcomings and inefficiencies of the mercanlile
mode were obliterated and the resistance offered by the state
alliance was all but withdrawn.
Prime Minister Bir Shamsher inaugurated his regime by
acquiescing to the long-standing demand of the British Indian
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go~ernm~nt to allow it unhindered access to Nepali labour power
of Its ch.OIce. Indeed, he actively encouraged it and even accepted
the BntIsh request not to recruit the Gurungs and the Magars in
the Nepali army. The breeding ground for the "Gurkha" labour
power, which had first been limited to a few locations in
Himachal Pradesh and had later spread to Utter Pradesh, Bihar,
Bengal and Assam, now covered the territory of "independent"
NepaL The Gurungs, Magars, Rais, and Limbus were in the
prime list of the British not only because these were the non-
Hinduisd components of the Nepali population; but also because
they were available in increasingly larger numbers, in large
measure due to the (by now) fast-paced weakening of the
~om~unal organization of .resource use and the consequent
ImmlsenzaUon of a substantial proponion of the households in
the central and the eastern hills.
As is well known, the recruits poured in. More than
27,OOO soldiers were hired between 1886 and 1904. Roughly
2oo thousand -- 20 percent of the adult male population in the
country -- were drawn to India during the first intercapitalist
global war (better known as World War One). Approximately the
same number participated in the second global war. The exodus
hurt agriculture and the food supply considerably. It also hun the
raising of land revenues. Beginning 1919, the British staned to
compensate this loss of revenue to the comprador state class by
maklllg an annual present qf.one million rupees. The amount,
expt'ctedly, was doubled following World War Two. In addition,
the Rana prime minister was awarded a gift of 1,750,000 pounds
for his help.
The British Indian officials were very happy that they
could force open recruitment. Indeed, the British concern for this
"free trade" was so palpable by 1884 that commodity trade with
Nepal was regarded by the government of India as a question of
altogether minor impoI1ance compared to the power of obtaining
Gurkha recruits. It was noted for a long time that the British were
prepared to make considerable concessions to the Nepali state
class for allowing this "access"
Marginalization in the Nepali hills and the demand for
labour by capital in parls of India resulted in another strong
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migratory "stream." Between 1891 and 1931 there was a five-
fold in~re~ in the number of Nepali migrants to Sikkim. Tea
plantatlon~ In West Bengal (Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri) and forest
clearance In Assam attracted a huge body of Nepali migrants. A
large number of "B~adurs"was also created during this period
who took on the duties of publIc and pnvate security maintenance
and daily wage labour.
To be sure, Prime Minister Bir Shamsher as well as the
later rellimes must hav.e been happy with the export of labour
power I~ as much as It brought in a very large sum of cash
Income I.n the country by way. of remittances, etc., but also
because. I~ absolved th~ .s~te alliance of the responsibility of
reorgamzIng and stabilIzIng the hill economy. The feudal
ownership of the Tarai resources, on the other hand, meant that
the expanse of the Tarai could accommodate a relatively small
number of tbe marginalized hill dwellers. Thus while the
marginal quality of the hill areas was continually reproduced in
more and more aggravated forms, the immiserized hill dwellers
and the resources of the Tarai could not be integrated within the
national perimeter.
. Ind~ed, . the. state class was actively pushing in the
opposite dl~ectIon In four major ways. The first avenue, the
export of hill labour power, has been discussed above. The
second avenue was trade, both exports and imports. The trade
figures shot up from Rs. 9.8 million in 1879-80 to Rs. 30 million
in 1890-91. In I?OO-Ol, 11913-14, ~nd 1920-21, the figures
were R:s. 39.9 million, Rs. 63.8 millIon and Rs. 87.9 million,
resl'ectIvely. The huge.export expansion became possible due (in
a?dltlon to the b~urcatlon of the organization of production in the
hill and the TaraI, as discussed above), mainly to: a) the increased
tempo of fore~t clearan~e in the Tarai; b) the expansion of
cultivated area m the TaraI -- almost the entire mid-western Tarai
was cultivated during this period; c) the increase in ·the scale of
cultivation of cash crops e.g., opium, jute, indigo, tobacco,
sugarcane; and d) the construction of railway lines across the
Nepali border. The expansion of import, on the other hand, was
~~d on: a) the enlargement of the state alliance; b) the increase
In Income through export; c) the increase in the rate of
consumption of high-elasticity imported luxuries; d) the sudden
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incr~ase in the flow of cash in the hills -- i.e., the stirrings of a
remlu.an~ econ.OI~y; and e) the onset of the disintegration of the
organIzatiOn of mdigenous manufactures and crafts at the national
:-cale. The massive increase in income was hoarded, used to buy
Imported cotton goods, metalware, glass ware, cigarettes, gold
and preci<:lUs stones, to build large homes as well as humongous
and luxunous palaces (including in the distant countryside bitra
locations), to the creation and sustenance of a huge body of
servants and retainers, to the buying of property, and in
hoardings and investments, in India and a number of other world
areas, including some of the capitalist metropolitan locations.
. The expansion of the Indian railway line just across the
Nepali border between 1885-1910 gave a great impetus to this
trade. Nepali timber, the primary source of wood for the
construction of railway lines all along northeast India, helped
capitalism to open up the Nepali market for other commodities. A
preliminary version of an outward-bound and expanded capital
recyclement regime was played out. It is, nonetheless, interesting
to note that the state alliance, ever fearful of the British military
mvolv.ement m Nepal, was wary of fully opening up. Time and
agaIn It rejected offers/requests to lay down railway lines inside
Nepal and link it up with the British Indian railway system.
However, as the trade figures bear out, this resistance was weak
as far as commerce was concerned.
The state alliance systematically discouraged household
crafts and artisans and traders by allowing imports of everyday
consumption commodities on large scales. Household crafts and
cottage industries in the hills wee badly hit in particular by the
flow of cotton goods and metalware. Raw cotton, extensively
cultivated in almost all parts of the hills, lost to machine-
produced, cheaper cloth. The skills required to cultivate and
process it slowly disappeared throughout the hills. The cash
needed to buy cloth, on the other hand, compelled an increasingly
larger proportion of hill households to seek seasonal, or
"permanent," manual jobs in Indian towns and cities. The rapid
expansion of the Indian industrial economy after the World War
I, in conjunction with the lilieralization of imports following the
1923 treaty, further undercut the basis of craft and industries in
•
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Nepal. Imports boomed -- including from Japan and Europe -- so
rapidly that Nepal devalued its currency by 1932.
The 1923 treaty did produce one positive impact on
Nepal, however. The guarantee of formal independence, coup!ed
with a general support received from the Bntlsh Indian
government, gave Chandra Shamsher the confidence he needed
to carry out several mildly anti-feudal measures. The most well
known of such measures was the abolition of (the almost wholly
domestic) slavery at state expense and the resettlement of the
slaves in Amlekhganj in the central Tarai. The treaty ~Iso. gave
him the confidence to lay down the Raxaul-Amlekhganj railroad
and to construct the Bhainse-Kathmandu ropeway line. These
acts of further opening-up, of course, led to the increase in the
scale of both exports and imports. The post-World War One
period in general and the post-1923 treaty. period in partic~lar
(which, in addition, also saw the establishment of the first
college, the first state-sponsored irrigation canal) appeared to
provide a lukewarm trend towards state support to natIOnal
accumulation, although it was along the feudal line. Juddha
Shamsher's efforts along these lines were stronger and qUite
admirable. The mid-1930's formed a period during which an
ideology of inward-looking and indigenous national development
gained some ground for the first time after Prithvi Narayan Shah.
The institution of Udyog Panshad (IndustnaIJDevelopmental
Board), the promulgation of the Company Law,. the
establishmcnt of the Nepal Bank Limited, the jute and vanous
other industrial establishments, could have led, in course of time,
to the creation of a dynamic national bourgeoisie. The point here,
however, is that the 1923 grant of independence was the most
important precondition for the potential generation of an
independent national bourgeoisie which. would have been
inherently exploitative and iniquitous but which would also have
more or less successfully guarded the state agamst outSide
capitalist onslaughts by itself engaging in inward-oriented,
expanded accumulation.
The loss of British hegemony following the first inter-
capitalist war, the birth of the Soviet Union, the Great Depression
and the global processes leading to the second round of the world
war provided much incentive to anti-colonial movements in the
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colonies. The Indian independence movement was a product of
this setting, with industrialists, traders and middle class gentries
as its leaders -- precisely a conglomeration which stood to gain
most from inheriting the capitalist infrastructure and by
establishing a necessarily compromised version of national
bourgeoisdom. The major opposition groups within Nepal --
excluding groups which were patently reactIOnary -- had a slml~ar
class basis (apart from the obvIOUS absence of md ustnal
entrepreneurs) and had imbibed a similar ideology. As it turned
out later, the ideology internalized by the opposition groups did
not serve Nepal's national interest we!!. This, because the
ideology was based on faulty reading~ of a) th~ world and
regional capitalist process; b) the natIOnalism of India;. c) the nse
of communism and the establishment of a commul1lst state m
China; d) Nepal's place in the politi«al-economic-military
processes in the region; and e) the precise extent of the
development of underdevelopment in Nepal and of the processes
leading to it.
The Past and the Present· 1950-1985
We now arrive at our most recent period in history, 1950-
1985. The onset of the period was itself interesting -- and
instructive -- in many ways. Apart from the United Kingdom and
India with whom we established diplomatic relations was the
basti;n of world capitalism, the United States, which was
beginning its tenure as the global hegemone. In 1950, as a
frontline slate against commUl1lsm, we began our history as an
aid-receiving nation. The Nepali labour power formed part of the
global military might in defense of Capltaltsm and was used
alternately as a primitive rapid deployment force, a regular front
line battalion, and as an anti-guerrilla operauons squad agamst
anti-imperialist, nationalist force. The Indian state that had fully
supported the Ranas for a couple of ~ears after its independence
suddenly switched Sides, followmg. the eJ.llergence of a
communist state up north, and clamped Its seclmty frontier up to
the Himalayas, thus incorporating Nepal Wlthll1 ItS military
perimeter. Tribhuvan Airport and Tnbhuvan Highway were
constructed by the fledgling IndianAir Force and Indian. Army,
respectively. The Indian Army contmued to operate the highway
long afterwards. In addition, the Indian state, which "preferred"
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to deal on monopolistic terms with neighbours and other third
world states, enforced a trade treaty which would necessarily
narrow Nepal's resource base and make it increasingly more
dependent on India. Combined with the "Friendship Treaty"
which was exclusively directed against Nepal's only other
neighbor, China, Nepal took shape as a near-full-fledged
hegemony of the Indian state and the Indian mercantile
bourgeoisie. In an immediate sense, these were parts of the costs
Nepal had to bear for the 1950-51 "revolution".
The 1950-1985 period was characterized by several
elements: a) nationwide, deeper peripheralization through
outward-bound flow of resource including commodity, labour
power and capital vis-a-vis India and the world capitalist
economy; b) immiserization of a very large proportion, probably
more than three-fourths of the hill households and two-fifths of
the Tarai households; c) a nationwide political coalition of
medium and large landed interests and state class interests; d) a
very fast growing incorporation of the mercantile bourgeoisie into
the state alliance; e) an enlargement of the state alliance,
particularly in the towns and district capitals; f) an expansion of
the effective scope of the state alliance in the formal political,
political-economic and social sectors; g) the diminution of the
household and the village-ethnic commun.ity; h) multiplication of
misconceived, ineffectual a,nti-poverty state programmes; j)
improvements in the transport-communication, education and
health sectors which, nonetheless, have largely augmented
underdevelopment; and k) an almost total inability to chart a
course toward an inward-bound production recyclement --
capitalistic or otherwise -- and an expanded accumulation regime
integrated at the national level.
If it is ironic that Nepal's political dependence increased
after the 1950-51 "democratic rp.vJlution," the degree of
economic openness and dependence was even more so. Although
it is a historical rule of the capitalist world-system that
economically primitive states lose out not at the beginning of the
precapitalist-capitalist exchange relationship but only later
(loosely, in the medium run), ironically it needed the "revolution"
and the resulting "democratic" setup for Nepal to be in the red in
commodity transactions. The volume of interstate commodity
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trade reached Rs. (I.e.) 265 million in 1956-57, from Rs. (I.C.)
88 million of 1920-21. The figure jumped more than four times
during the next 10 years and reached Rs. (N.C.) 1157 million in
1966-67. It almost tripled again in 1976-77 at Rs. (N.C.) 3173
million. It more than doubled in the next five years (1981-82) and
reached Rs. (N.e.) 6429 million. Imports as a percentage of
GDP went up from 9 percent to 15 percent between 1969-70 and
1979-80 (all figures are at current prices). The composition of
interstate commodity trade, on the other hand, continued to
reinforce underdevelopment by emphasizing the export of
primary goods, principally food items and non-fuel raw
materials, which accounted for more than' three-fourths of all
exports for 1981-82. Imports were mainly composed of
manufactured products, fuel, chemicals, and food items. The
interstate commodity trade balance is so lopsided by now that the
value of merchandise exports for 1981-82 was only one-third of
the value of merchandise imports. The balance of interstate
payments as a whole turned red for the first time in 1983 despiLc
the fairly large incomes from tourism, remittance by migrant
labourers in India and elsewhere, and interstate grants and loans.
The dependence of ihe state on import duties was very high and
growing; these formed 25-34 percent of the total annual revenue
of the central governmcnt ever since the 1970s. What this also
means of course is that there is less scope now for national
expanded accumulation than before. At the same time, it also
means that the existing national resource recyclement regime is
rapidly getting weaker.
Hence the increasing deterioration of the ecosystem and
of the food, feed and fuel chain and unemployment and under-
employment on the one hand and "overpopulation" on the other.
The emigration and remittance regimes -- processes as
intimately connected to the capitalist world-system as the import
and export of commodities (what are commodities but
embodiments of labour!) -- have been strengthened in the last 35
years. More than 4 percent of the total population was emigre in
1961. There is a large quantity of circumstantial evidence which
indicates that both Nepali and Indian census systematically under-
enumerate Nepal-India migrants. The actual proportion of India-
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bound Nepali migrants may be much larger not only for 1961 but
also for the later years.
Probably much more important, both in terms of the
number of households involved and the scale of remittance, is
seasonal migration of labour to India. A number of independent
studies on the western and eastern hills report very high rates of
seasonal labour migration to India. In general, it appears that 15-
20 percent of all households in the hills/mountains may have one
or more family members in India for 2-5 months per year as
seasonal labourers. The majority of the migrants -- whether
seasonal or semi-permanent/permanent -- are young adult males,
even excluding those in the Indian and British armies and those in
"security duty" in Brunei, Singapore and other semi-peripheral
capitalist areas.
The emigre households, in continual pressure to change
their structure and lifecycle in keeping with the (uncertain and
fluctuating) demand for labour in India or outside (or in the
TarailKathmandu Valley for that matter), have deformed
themselves vis-a-vis the local organizations of production; that is,
the effective structure of the household, the sexual division of
labour, the demand for children (including the sex-specific
demand for children), work socialization and mode of resource
ownership and use have become geared more to the IndianlTarai
market than to the local setting. This is particularly salient in the
western region of Nepal which has historically been exposec;l
longer and more intensively to capitalist influences and thus
intimately peripheralized. Recycling of local resources is the
poorest there and thus the earlier and much faster rate oJ
deterioration of the ecosystem. Contradictions between the long-
standing institution of private property and the social and
communal nature of production have also contributed to
ecological deterioration, e.g., the fast-disappearing common
lands, pastures, as also to "overpopulation" and chronic and
serious food scarcity there.
The outflow of capital is very difficult to document --
mostly because it is deliberately hidden or camouflaged. Three
avenues of leakage, however, may be identified. The first is the
profit Indian citizens draw out of their industrial!
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commercial/agricultural/ financial/service-oriented investment in
Nepal. The scale of such investments is not known, but generally
acknowledged as large. Indian investment in Nepal has a long
history. The new expansIOn of Indian commerCial capital,
however, can most easily be seen in the wholesale and retail
trade/sm~ggling of "third country" goods from Nepal to India,
food gram wh olesale trade, and remittance through the sale of
skilled/semi-skilled labour power. Commercial capital, it should
be noted, IS recycled very fast and is repatriated at the same
speed. The second avenue of capital outflow is the hoarding!
mvestment/expendlture Nepalis make in India and other states.
This is another area where-information is lacking. The official
figure, for 1950, compiled by the Indian government, showed
that the IOtal hoarding/investment made by Nepalis was
equivalent to Rs. (I.e.) 44 million. Unofficial estimates,
however, are much larger. A fairly substantial proportion of the
bour~eOlsle, the Tarai landlords and the larger trading houses
promll1ent among them, own properties and investments in India.
It IS also probable that a few families own properties/investments
m other states and capitals. A large amount of potential capital
also flows out by way of educational, medical and other
expenditures visiting Nepalis make in India.
However, it is through systematic unequal exchange in
commodIly/labour transactions that capital flows are largely
deCided. We have already dwelled upon the power of the capital
over margmaltzed labours as well as the increase in commodity
transaction, especially import, on the part of Nepal. Unequal
exchange IS a mechanism of division of labour under which a
given political-economic set-up (whether a state or a region or a
sector) successively envelops the market of another political-
economic set-up because the productivity of the former, per unit
of labour, IS higher than that in the later (which is also another
way of saying that the wage rate is lower in the former than in the
later, per unit of production). It is not merely that it takes six
months of ~ard labour for an old man in Salyan to buy a pair of
Bombay mills pair of coats; the point is that it si;all take even
longer in the future. It should be emphasized that this is not a
one-shot penetration, but one which works over a long period. It
not only displaces the indigenous products, but inexorably works
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itself out to undermine the political-economic bases of aperipheral system. This is essentially the regimen under which
the multiplier/accelerator gets systematically exported from Nepalto India or elsewhere. This is also why capitalism enforces "opendoor economic policy" and glibly idolizes the "comparative
advantage to the accrued from international trade:' ~d "globalpartnership." This clearly was the longer run obJectlv~ .of the1950 Indo-Nepal treaties, as far as the Indian bourgeOIsie was
concerned. If India has become less blatant about ItS sta.te-
supported capitalism vis-a-vis Nepal, it isonly because Indian
capitalism is coming of age, I.e., It IS beco~mg competitive at the
world level in some production sectors m some markets. It ISinteresting, nonetheless, that less than one percent of the totalIndian aid has gone to the industrial sector.
Development of Underdevelopment· Facts Levels. Constraints
and Options
The facts of the development of underdevelopment at thepresent, as one of its historical-structural characteristics, are
manifold and multilayered. It should be noted that these are facets
only when underdevelopment is analyzed in a static frame; inprocessualterms these "facets" further lead to an enhancement of
underdevelopment. The constraints under which the present s~te
alliance lives, and the options it exercises and/or falls to exercise,
constitute an important facet of the developm~nt of
underdevelopment. The state alliance cannot lead a coalit~on of
national bourgeoisie and engage in an expanded caplt~hst •
accumulation regime for several reasons: a) penpherahzed
extensively and intensively for more than one-hundred year~, tJ:e
national bourgeoisie -- the national industrial bo.urgeOlsle mparticular -- is a very weak force here; b) firms and mdustnes, atleast in the short run, cannot acqUire a competitive edge; c) the
existing scale of interstate commodity transactiQn c~nnbt bedrastically cut down -- and national accumulation subSidized --
not only on account of local demand and interstatelinternationalpressure for sq,Pply but also.because a very large proportion of
the annual national state revenue -- varying between 25 percent
and 58 percent in the last 20 y~ars -- a~crues from in.terstate
commodity trade, the bulk of It from Important duties and
associated taxes; d)' the hill households, as well as the state as a
. ,
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whole, cannot forego the emigration and remittance routine; e) the
state alliance cannot afford large-scale proletarianization -- aninevitable consequence of the capitalist accumulative process; andf) because the compradoI' commercial bourgeoisie has become aprominent component of the state alliance. Thus you have a boomin imports, a boom on trading and smuggling of imported
commodities but also an agrarian system which is unproductive
and apparently becoming more so -- and an industrial!
manufacturing base which shrinks more than it expands. Thusyou have emigrant households who feel happy over the fact that
the Nepali currency has been devalued against the Indian
cun·ency. Thus you have a land reform programme which ties thelandlord and the labourer in a relationship which slows down
effective landlessness and rural proletarianization but alsoprecludes increases in agricultural production, and whichlegitimizes the vastly iniquitous distribution of landholding in thehills and the Tarai, which, in tum, (as in a mini version of thelatifundia agrarian system) sustains the export of primary goods
and labour power, the imporl regimen, and the regional and
national class structure. Thus also there is an overemphasis onthe transport and communication infrastructure which along withits beneficial aspects increasingly reinforces the image of Nepal
as an entity where porters, trucks and aeroplanes bound insidethe border -- particularly to the north -- are loaded to the full
while those which flow across the border and to the south arethree-fourths empty. Thus the lack of success of the well-intentioned New Education System Plan which neither
comprehends the relationship among class, production and
education in our present set up nor is penetrating enough to be
wary of the optimistic forecasts on the expansion of the national
economy. Thus also you have immigration into the Tarai,
emigration from the hills, immigration from north India and theproblems of citizenship and dual citizenship. Finally, you have
state-sponsored monopolies, i.e., corporations, whichperennially run on the red.
Nor can the present state alliance pave the way f(lr a
socialized political-economy -- admilledly a much more far-fet.ehed option, not only because it would obliterate the economicbasis for the preeminence of the present state alliance, the larger
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landlords and the comprador commercial bourgeoisie in
particular, but also because such an option would involve a
considerable devolution of authority to local governments and
thus be contrary to the larger scale processes of centralization -- a
necessary process for the particular form of state we run and the
interstate setting we live in -- witnessed since the late -1950s. It is
also far-fetched because it would be difficult to enforce, given the
highly capitalism-dependent nature of our economy on the one
hand and the world/regional capitalist system which, as already
discussed, thrives on the basis of continual expansion. Thus you
have an import-based commercial bourgeoisie which is
prospering and expanding very fast. You have feudal
organization in the Tarai which is weakening, in part due to the
success of the commercial bourgeoisie, but nonetheless on its
feet.
There are other options, e.g. expansive multi-
nationalization, but these are even less "realistic." Given the
advanced stage of openness, peripheralization and dependence,
this may really not be an altogether unattractive economic option
on our part -- a production regime which is capitalist both in the
best and the worst senses but which would also expand the
accumulative base inside the national frontier -- minus the
remittances, royalties and interests. But this would have its own
costs as well, including proletarianization, break-up of feudal
relations and further internalization of domestic politics. In
addition, multinationals are necessarily extremely choosy abollt
markets, sectors and profits -- shout run at that -- and thus cannot
be expected to tie up the national economy.
Another facet of the development of underdevelopment
can be seen in the form of maintenance and change in the class
structure. The "Poorest 20" that we belong to, we nurse, and
continue to fortify the bases of, one of the highest degrees of
inequality in asset and income distribution in the world. The top
10 percent of the households earned as much as 47 percent of the
total national income. The bottom 44 percent of the population,
on the other hand, earned only 10 percent of the total national
income. (Data refer to 1976-77.) Similarly, 10 percent of all
households owned 59 percent of all agricultural land area in 1972
-- seven years after the implementation of the much-celebrated
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.1964 L~nd Act. The rough but overall meaning of this
informatton IS clear; not only the marginalized masses but also the
bourgeoisie is .continually shortchanged through unequal
exchan¥e In vanous forms of interstate transactions, while the
state allIan~e In Nepal has been quite successful in creating newer
so~rces o.f Internal and exte~al sources of wealth/exploitation to
maIntaIn Its economic preemmence.
The contrasting generations of architecture in the
Kathmandu Valley provide an often overlooked manifestation of
!his development of underdevelopment. The trade-, crafts-, and
mtenslve. agnculture-based, integrated, developed and prcsperous
~ommumty-onented SOCial lIfe of the bahi slowly deteriorated as
It was sup~lanted b~ singular, splendent, isolated and forbidding
palaces b~llt accordIng to Greco-Roman (neoclassical European)
speclflcattons and financed through the outward-bound sale of
Taral merchandise and hill labour power. The new architecture
reflects a slight enlargement of the bourgeoisie ensconced in
much smaller but comfortable, indoor-plumbing homes with
g~lIs and h!gh walls topped by barbed wire and/or glass shards
wIth occaSIOnal plates which shout at strangers to beware of
exotic canine breeds.
Other facets of the development of underdevelopment
may be seen at the levels of the community and the household.
The community -- in however "remote/inaccessible" an area it
might be -- has been weakened a very great deal by now, largely
through the processes of privatization, peripheralization and
centralIzatIOn. It IS a much less cohesive/cooperative unit than
before because community resources have drastically shrunk in
the last 35 years, and also because it is increasingly dependent on
outside sources for its economics and politics, e.g., on district
headquarters, nearby towns Kathmandu, The Tarai, and Indian
towns and cities. Its role in running its current affairs and
planning for its future have been much reduced. Thus you have
the problem of "popular participation" at the community level; the
exhortation is becoming shriller precisely when the basis of
participation is being rapidly eroded. The household, as can be
expected, has not been immune to the development of
underdevelopment. As already noted, a substantial proportion of
the households, particularly in the hills, have deformed
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themselves vis-a-vis income generation, fertility, family
relationship and the like.
These process arc fairly well reOected in certain other
macro-economic indicators. A state which was one of the leading
exporters of rice till the early-1960s is systematically importing
foodgrain beginning in the 1980s. A state which had one of the
highest productivities in rain-fed South Asia till the mid-1960s
was along the bottom of the scale beginning in the mid-I970s.
Food production per-person has declined substantially. The
industrial sector, particularly manufacturing, has remained
retarded for a long period at an extremely low level. The
composition of intcr-state commodity transaction confirms the
long-standing predominance of primary goods on the export side
and that of fuel, transportation equipment and manufactured
products on the import side. The gross national product, per
person, increased only by 0.1 percent between 1965-83.
Surely, not all performances are poor. As already noted.
there have been definite improvements in certain sectors, e.g.,
transport and communication, literacy, and public health; no less
important is the provision of a nation-wide organizational frame
for political administration. However, improvements in these
sectors -- barring the public health sector -- have either enhanced
underdevelopment or have remained untied with the national
production systems.
Recapitulation
Let mc summarize the arguments made so far.
Development has very little to do with an abundance of resources
whether natural or financial, or with advanced or even
"appropriate" technology per se. We have generated a large
amount of resources through agriculture, forestry, small scale
industry, trade, remittance, and latterly, through foreign aid. But
these have not helped us develop. Development essentially has to
do with the social mode in which we reprocess whatever resource
we have and distribute the rewards for doing so within a socially
bounded unit and, in so doing, rccreate the capability to
reproduce the cyclc. The social unit may he a househC'ld, a
kinship group, community, tribe, a rcgional grouping, a nation-
state, or even a group of nation-states. But to the extent that we
live in an interstate world system' -- itself a contribution of the
process which also generated development and
underdevelopment -- "development" often refers to the nation-
state level and levels subsidiary to it.
Now there are various ways in which the resource
reprocessing-capability reproducing-resource reprocessing-cycle
can be damaged. Prolonged drougbts, blights, epidemics.
internal wars and the like are examples. Certainly, there are
histories of households and entire communities which have been
altogether wiped out by these disasters. But these disasters are
events which take place rather irregularly". More importantly,
almost all societies leam/invent mechanisms to soften the impact
of such events, e.g., storage of food items, various
prescriptive/ritual modes of re-establishment of amity between
warring groups etc. Indeed, some hunting-gathering groups
practice selective but systematic infanticide to keep the cycle
moving, however unpleasant that particular option might be. The
potentiality of systematic damage. nonetheless, is localized:
neighbouring hunting-gathering groups may not be required to
practice infanticide to keep their own cycle moving.
The advent and growth of capitalism, however, makes
damage control in the non-metropolitan areas extremely difficult,
if not altogether impossible. This is because capitalism thrives on
the basis of incessant expansion. The damage caused by core
capitalism to the cycles at the semipelipheral and peripheral areas
is regular, systematic, intensive (defined in terms of the degree of
damage suffered by the cycle at differel1l levels of organization of
production in a social unit) and extensive (defined in telms of the
damage suffered by the cycle in different sectors of production in
a social unit). Depending upon tbe guardedness (or openness) of
the social unit in question and the relative strength (or relative
;' weakness) of the capitalist system making efforts to expand, the
damage' becomes progressively larger. At times it becomes
irreversible. Progression and irreversibility of damage may occur
at various sectors -- manufacturing, agriculture, entire physical
ecology of a region, education -- and at various levels --
household, community, state, continent. Monopoly capitalism
has the charm that, unlike colonial capitalism, it can damage the
cycle at various sectors and levels in the peripheral social units
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wit!J?ut necessa;ily expanding militarily, i.e., by lapsing fonnal
political .soverelgnty. Expansion operates through markets, of
commodities, labour power, skill, capital, finance, treaties and
above all, alliances. Hence the "strength" of the inter-state world
system. Hence, in a large measure, the development of the core
capitalist areas and its obverse -- the development of
underdevelopment -- in the semi-peripheral and peripheral areas.
Let us come back to the resource reprocessing-reward
distributing-capability reproducing-resource reprocessing- cycle
for a moment. A social unit is a viable entity to the extent that it
can keep the cycle moving. To the extent that it has not been able
to utilize each of ~ese three faculties within a well-integrated
frame at an optImal level, and over the long run, it is
u~developed. To the exten.t that it keeps the cycle moving by
UtlliZlOg each of these faculties at the maximal level over the short
run, it is overdeveloped: Finally, to the extent that it keeps the
cycle movlOg by enhanclOg each of these faculties within a well-
integrated frame over the long run, it is developed.
Underdevelopment, on the other hand, is a cycle which moves
only intermittently, or at a speed much slower than used to be
normal, or altogether stops, either because one or all of its
faculties are. impaired or because the integrative mechanisms
weaken or fatl alto!;ether due to its interaction with an alien cycle,
whIch IS runnlOg With enhanced faculties within an expanding yet
highly integrated frame.
States in the periphery can protect their own cycle from
the stl1!ctural violence .of the enhanced, well-integrated and
expandlOg world capitalist cycle only by following one of two
potions. The first option is the creation of a dynamic, i.e.
capitalist, national bourgeoisie who assume the responsibility to
restore the damage, breathe life into the severely weakened
faculties and fend off the much more powerful cycle by
themselves engaging in inward-oriented accumulation. The state,
in this context, would have to take on two other roles, that of
containing reactions against intensive internal exploitation from
th~ :working class and against the loss of prerogatives and
pnvileges from the state class, the feudals, the urban "middle
class" and the comprador bourgeoisie on the one hand and that of
controlling the onslaught of capitalism from the outside on the
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other. The other option is the creation of a socialized national
economy which, in the short run, would assume responsibility to
perform tasks very similar to those expected from the national
bourgeoisie. The state, in such a context, would have to take on
the role of containing the outbursts and· prolonged reactions of
almost all components of the present state alliance (because this
would involve a radical restructuring of the organization of
resource ownership, use and distribution of rewards) and also
control sustained and systematic assaults from the capitalist
world-and regional-system. Both options presume a national
boundedness as the first requisite: nationalism and development
are intrinsically tied; you cannot hope to cultivate one without
cultivating the other. This, indeed, is the essence of socialism in
the third world. Neither option, it should be emphasized, can
revitalize the cycle in the short run. Both options, on the other
hand presume a time-bound restructuring of the present Slate
alliance -- immediate restructuring in the case of the second
option and a phased, but still definitely time-bound, restructuring
in the case of the first option.
"Option," however, is a wrong expression in the present
context. It conveys a sense of autonomy of choice on the part of
the actor, in addition to a certain time-discretion. We have very
little left of either. Nonetheless, an option has to be exercised --
with minimal loss of time -- not the least because the capitalist
world- and regional-economy is increasingly making us option-
less; it is itself exercising options for us. As I have tried to show,
we began to lose the power to decide progressively back in 1885.
The cycle began to be damaged and so did our autonomy.
We are near optionless in another sense, too. The one
century-long peripheralization and maintenance of comprador
structures -- exacerbated beginning the late -1960s -- has left our
national bourgeoisie in shambles. The Tarai feudal lorJs who
could, under supporti ve circumstance, have transformed
themselves into a sizable and powerful first-generation national
bourgeoisie do not bear that potential any more. The possibility
of a viable capitalist, internally accumulative and exploitative
political-economic regime must, therefore, be regarded as nearly
foreclosed. The ensemble of the "options" currently being
exercised --IRDPs, "basic needs", etc., is not at all likely to
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breathe life into the enfeebled cycle. The "option," therefore, has
to lie with a socialized national political-economy. Repairing the
damage, nonetheless, will be a difficult, long, drawnout affair,
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